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Abstract
We present a novel framework, called Private Disclosure of
Information (PDI), which is aimed to prevent an adversary
from inferring certain sensitive information about subjects us-
ing the data that they disclosed during communication with
an intended recipient. We show cases where it is possible
to achieve perfect privacy regardless of the adversary’s aux-
iliary knowledge while preserving full utility of the informa-
tion to the intended recipient and provide sufficient conditions
for such cases. We also demonstrate the applicability of PDI
on a real-world data set that simulates a health tele-monitoring
scenario.
1 Introduction
Data collection and sharing is growing to unprecedented vol-
umes. Some of the reasons for this phenomenon include the
decrease in storage cost, the rise of social networks, the ubiq-
uity of smartphones and law regulations. For example, in
many states in the US, medical institutions are obliged to make
demographics data public about their patients (NAHDO, 1996;
Sweeney, 2002; OSHPD, 2014).
Warner (1965) argues that the lack of privacy guarantees
can cause subjects to be reluctant to share their data with data
collectors (such as doctors, government agencies, researchers,
etc.) or even result in subjects providing false information.
Therefore, subjects need to be assured that their privacy will
be preserved throughout the whole process of data collection
and use.
One of the emerging areas with growing interest to collect
sensitive personal and private data is health tele-monitoring. In
this setting, a technology is used to collect health-related data
about patients, which are later submitted to a medical staff for
monitoring. The data are then used to assess the health status
of patients and provide them with feedback and/or interven-
tion. Research indicates that such technologies can improve
readmission rates and lower overall costs (Clark et al., 2007;
Chaudhry et al., 2010; Inglis, 2010; Giamouzis et al., 2012;
Aranki et al., 2014). In such scenarios, the collected data are
usually of sensitive nature from a privacy point of view and
therefore privacy preserving technologies are needed in order
to protect patients’ privacy and increase compliance.
There are multiple stages in the life-cycle of data, including
i) the disclosure (or submission) of the data by the subjects to
the data collector; ii) the processing of the data; iii) the anal-
ysis; and/or iv) the publishing of (often a privatized version
of) the data or some findings based on them. In this paper we
focus on the phase of disclosure of privacy-sensitive data by
the data owners. Our framework for Private Disclosure of In-
formation (PDI) is thus aimed to prevent an adversary from
inferring certain sensitive information about the subject using
the data that were disclosed during communication with an in-
tended recipient. This is analogous to the problem of attribute
linkage in statistical database privacy.
In traditional encryption approaches to maintaining privacy,
it is often implicitly assumed that the data themselves are the
private information. However, in more general scenarios, the
data can be used to infer some private information about the
subjects for which the data apply. For example, respiration rate
by itself might not be considered private information. How-
ever, if the data from the collected respiration rate are used to
infer whether the individual is a smoker or not, they become
sensitive information. One can argue that because the informa-
tion about whether someone smokes is private, the respiration
rate data become private by implication.
Under such circumstances, one should attempt to privatize
the transmitted data in a way that reveals as little as possible
about the private information to an adversary. In summary, our
objective is to encode the transmitted data in order to hide an-
other private piece of information. In the words of Sweeney
(2002): “Computer security is not privacy protection.” The
converse is also true, privacy does not replace security. Our
approach is therefore to be viewed as complementary to clas-
sical security approaches. For example, data can be privatized
then encrypted.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we provide a survey of the literature for related work. In Sec-
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tion 3 we provide the motivation to the problem and formulate
it, followed by further analysis in Section 4. We then discuss
implementation details of the learning problem in Section 5
followed by experimental results in Section 6. Finally, we
close by discussing our conclusions and future research direc-
tions in Section 7.
2 Related Work
The study of privacy-preserving techniques and technologies
in the fields of statistics, computer security and databases, and
their intersections, dates back to at least 1965 when Warner
proposed a randomization technique for conducting surveys
and collecting responses for the purpose of statistical and pop-
ulation analysis. Since then, extensive privacy research in
the fields above was conducted. Therefore, in the interest of
brevity, we provide a brief overview of the areas of study re-
lated to our work and refer the reader to more comprehensive
surveys in each area.
Recently, attention to privacy has been rising in the health-
care domain with the spread of electronic health-records us-
age and the growing data sharing between medical institutions.
It has been reported that consumers are expressing increasing
concerns regarding their health privacy (Bishop et al., 2005;
Hsiao and Hing, 2012). Most of the research in privacy from
the health community focuses on medical data publishing and
is therefore database-centric. For a survey of results in this do-
main, we refer the reader to (Gkoulalas-Divanis et al., 2014).
In more general-purpose scenarios, the privacy of statisti-
cal databases and data publishing has been extensively stud-
ied. Denning and Schlorer (1983) presented some of the
early threats related to inference in statistical databases and
reviewed controls that are based on the lattice model (Den-
ning, 1976). Duncan and Lambert (1989, 1986) studied meth-
ods for limiting disclosure and linkage risks in data publishing.
Sandhu (1993) provided a tutorial on lattice-based access con-
trols for information flow security and privacy. Later, Farkas
and Jajodia (2002) provided a survey of more results in the
field of access controls to the inference problem in database
security. For rigorous surveys in the fields of data publishing
privacy and statistical databases privacy, we refer the reader
to (Adam and Worthmann, 1989; Fung et al., 2010).
Two semantic models of database privacy of growing inter-
est in the privacy literature are k-anonymity (Sweeney, 2002)
and differential privacy (Dwork, 2006, 2008). In k-anonymity,
given a set of quasi-identifiers that can be used to re-identify
subjects, a table is called k-anonymous if every combination
of quasi-identifiers in the table appears in at least k records.
If a table is k-anonymous, assuming each individual has a
single record in the table, then the probability of linking a
record to an individual is at most 1/k. Other extensions and
refinements of k-anonymity have been proposed including l-
diversity (Machanavajjhala et al., 2007), t-closeness (Li et al.,
2007) and others.
In differential privacy, the requirement is that the output
of a statistical query should not be too sensitive to any sin-
gle record in the database. Formally, given a statistical query
M , then M is -differentially private if P (M (D1) ∈ S) ≤
e × P (M (D2) ∈ S) for any two realizations D1 and D2 of
the database such that |D1∆D2| = 1 and all S ⊂ Range(M),
where D1∆D2 is the symmetric difference between D1 and
D2 (Dwork, 2006, 2008). Cormode (2011) showed that sensi-
tive attribute inference can be done on databases that are dif-
ferentially private and l-diverse with similar accuracy.
As can be seen from the review above, most of the research
in data-privacy is focused on privacy-preserving data publish-
ing and privacy-preserving statistical databases. In contrast,
in this work we focus on preventing adverserial statistical in-
ference of a piece of private information based on the dis-
closed messages in an individual’s information exchange sce-
nario during communication.
3 Problem Formulation
3.1 Notation
We use the following shorthand notation for probability den-
sity (mass) functions. We always use a pair of a capital and a
small symbols of the same letter for a random variable and a
realization of it, respectively. For notation simplicity and con-
ciseness, given random variables X and Y , instead of writing
pX(x) for the marginal density (mass) function of X we sim-
ply write p(x), and instead of writing pX|Y (x|y) for the condi-
tional density (mass) function of X given Y , we simply write
p(x|y).
3.2 Motivation and Threat Model
We are primarily motivated by the tele-monitoring setting. In
this setting, a doctor wishes to monitor her patients remotely
using a technology that can collect and transmit health-related
data. The shared data are of sensitive nature because they can
be used to infer private pieces of information like a health-
condition or a disease. For example, updates about a patient’s
weight can lead to disclosure of obesity as it will be demon-
strated in Section 6.
More generally, an information provider Bob wants to dis-
close a piece of information x to some recipient Alice. Fur-
thermore, the information x can be used to infer some private
information c about Bob. However, there is no guarantee that
the transmitted information will not be intercepted and poten-
tially used for inference of the private information c about Bob
by an untrusted but passive eavesdropper Eve. Finally, in this
setting, we assume that Alice is more certain about c than Eve
is. The problem at hand is delivering the information x under
these circumstances such that Alice can make full use of the
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Figure 1: The Graphical Model of PDI
information but that Eve’s ability to infer c about Bob, using
the transmitted message, is minimized.
As a concrete example, consider the following scenario in
health tele-monitoring. A patient Bob is trying to update his
physician Alice about his weight and body mass index (BMI).1
Since Alice is Bob’s physician, she already knows the weight
status category of Bob which he considers to be private infor-
mation.2 Eve, however, does not know Bob’s weight status
category a priori but would like to learn it from the messages
he sends to Alice. If Eve succeeds to listen in on the communi-
cation between Bob and Alice, Eve can, with some accuracy,
infer the weight status category of Bob. Alice, being a con-
siderate physician, wants to ensure the privacy of her patients.
Alice decides to create an encoding scheme (that can be made
public) for the communication such that the encoding is differ-
ent per weight status group. Her objective is to make this en-
coding scheme “as privacy-preserving as possible” in the sense
of keeping her patients’ weight status category information as
private as possible to someone who does not know it a priori.
It is important to compare this scenario with the classical
security approach. In classical security, the objective is to pro-
tect the transmitted message itself without taking into consid-
eration an adversarial effort to statistically infer private infor-
mation using the cipher-text. It has been demonstrated that sta-
tistical inference can still be performed on encrypted data (For
example White et al., 2011; Miller et al., 2014). We comple-
ment this by capturing the notion of statistical inference of the
private information c from the transmitted data, and aim to find
a way to minimize the ability of an adversary to infer c using
the transmitted data.
3.3 Problem Definition
Towards a more formal representation of the problem, we con-
sider scenarios where i) Bob’s identity, s, is attached to any
message that is sent by him; ii) there is no guarantee that the
sent information will not be intercepted by an untrusted but
passive eavesdropper Eve; iii) the information x can be used
to infer some private information c about Bob; and iv) Alice
knows the private information c about Bob but Eve does not.
1BMI is a measure of relative weight based on an individual’s mass and
height. Defined as BMI , mass(kg)
height(m)2
.
2Weight status category indicates if an individual is underweight, over-
weight, obese or has a healthy weight.
Under these assumptions, Bob would like to exploit the fact
that Alice knows c but Eve does not in order to send a mes-
sage z that is more useful to Alice than Eve. The utility value
of the message follows the following decoding and “hiding
class” (HC) premises:
DECODING Alice can make full use of the sent information
z, i.e. obtain the original message x from the transmitted
message z; and
HC Eve’s ability to make inference about c given s, based on
the sent information z is minimized.
Formally, we use S for the set of identifiers of information
providers, I for the information space and Σ for the set of
private classes (the private information about the information
providers). Similarly, we define the random variables S for
the identifier of the information provider, X for the piece of
information that the provider would like to disclose, C for the
class that the provider belongs to and Z for the encoded mes-
sage that will be sent (called privatized information), which
is a function of the original information and the class. We
call this function a privacy mapping function and define it as
R : Σ→ II where II is the set of injective functions I → I.
A simple way to think aboutR is as an encoding scheme. That
is, for every class c ∈ Σ, it outputs an encoding function for
the input information x. Given c ∈ Σ, since R (c) is injective,
then there exists a left inverse Rl (c) which will be used to de-
code the messages z sent from subjects in class c.3 From that,
Z is simply equal to [R(C)] (X). The statistical model that
relates these random variables is described in Figure 1.
For conciseness, in this paper we treat the case of contin-
uous information spaces. Note that in the case of a discrete
information space, the reader is instructed to follow the discus-
sion by substituting probability density functions with proba-
bility mass functions for the distributions of X and Z. Note
that our treatment also covers the case of information spaces of
mixed nature (that are discrete in some attributes and continu-
ous in others) by using the appropriate probability distribution
functions.
For the model in Figure 1, one needs to supply the following
probability distributions. p(s), the prior of subjects transmit-
ting messages in the system. p(c|s), the adversary’s prior of
class membership for the different subjects (based on auxil-
iary knowledge). p(x|c, s), the generative model of data given
a class and a subject. Finally, p(z|x, c) is simple and can
be modeled as P (Z = z|X = x,C = c) = 1 if and only if
z = [R(c)] (x) and 0 otherwise, for all z, x ∈ I and c ∈ Σ.
Recall that the identity s of the information provider is at-
tached with the transmitted message. Moreover, the intended
recipient knows the class c of the information provider. There-
fore, because of the injectivity requirement of the privacy map-
ping function, the intended recipient can decode the sent infor-
3We say that g : D2 → D1 is a left inverse of a function f : D1 → D2
if for all x ∈ D1 we have g (f (x)) = x.
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mation z back to the original message x. Hence the require-
ment (DECODING) is satisfied.
Finally, in order to satisfy the second requirement (HC) we
would like to find a privacy mapping function R that min-
imizes the amount of information that the privatized infor-
mation Z carries for the sake of inferring the private class
C, given the subject identifier S, to an adversary. We adopt
the measure of (conditional) mutual information to model this
quantity. We present the definition of conditional mutual infor-
mation for continuous random variables, and refer the reader
to (Cover and Thomas, 2006, Definitions 2.61 and 8.54) for
the corresponding definitions concerning discrete random vari-
ables and random variables that can be mixtures of discrete and
continuous, respectively.
Definition 1 (Cover and Thomas, 2006, c.f. Definition 8.49).
Let X,Y and Z be random variables. The conditional mutual
information of X and Y given Z, I(X,Y |Z), is defined as
I(X,Y |Z) , Ep(x,y,z)
[
log
p(x, y|z)
p(x|z)p(y|z)
]
Intuitively, I(Z,C|S;R) measures in bits, the expected
amount of mutual information that the random variables Z =
[R(C)] (X) and C have, given the information in S.4 Mutual
information also provides a sufficient and necessary condition
for conditional independence as follows.
Lemma 1 (Cover and Thomas, 2006, c.f. Corollary 2.92; c.f.
Theorem 8.6.1). I(Z,C|S;R) ≥ 0 for any privacy mapping
function R. Furthermore, I(Z,C|S;R) = 0 if and only if Z
andC are conditionally independent given S using the privacy
mapping function R.
From the intuition above, and the fact in Lemma 1, we set
our objective to find a privacy mapping function R that mini-
mizes the conditional mutual information of the privatized in-
formation Z and the private class C given the identity of the
information provider S such that the model in Figure 1 holds.
In short,
R∗ = arg min
R
I(Z,C|S;R) (1)
subject to R is a privacy mapping function
and Model in Figure 1
Once a privacy mapping function R is chosen, the commu-
nication process can be carried as follows.
Sending The transaction of disclosing a piece of information
x ∈ I by an information provider belonging to class c ∈
Σ is performed by applying the following transformation
z ← [R(c)] (x) and sending z (or some encrypted version
of it).
Receiving The transaction of receiving a piece of information
z ∈ I sent by an information provider belonging to class
4The units are bits assuming the log base in Definition 1 is 2.
c ∈ Σ is performed by applying x← [Rl(c)] (z). Where
Rl(c) is a left inverse of R(c).
Note that the problem in Equation (1) is not a convex prob-
lem. Furthermore, it is of interest to study how to learn the
model in Figure 1 and find an optimal privacy mapping func-
tion R from data. We will address this question in Section 5,
but first we further study the properties of the formulated
framework in the following section.
4 Further Analysis
First, we relate the value of the objective function in Equa-
tion (1) to Bayesian inference in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. If a privacy mapping function R yields
I(Z,C|S;R) = 0 then Bayesian inference of C based on Z is
prevented for the adversary.
Proof. From Lemma 1 we know that Z is conditionally inde-
pendent of C given S which means p(c|z, s) = p(c|s) which
is the prior of the class membership that the adversary already
possesses. Therefore, the disclosure of Z does not change the
adversary’s belief regarding the private information C given
the subject identifier S.
The next question that we need to ask is whether a privacy
mapping function R satisfying I(Z,C|S;R) = 0 is ever at-
tainable. There are three reasons for this question. First, if
such a privacy mapping function R exists, then it means that
by knowing S (which is always attached to the message), Z
provides no extra information to inferring C to an adversary,
which sounds surprising. Second, there is generally a trade-off
between information utility and privacy where optimal privacy
is usually only attained at the cost of no utility (Dwork, 2006).
In our case, the utility of the information Z to the intended
recipient is always fully preserved, unrelated of the choice of
R, since R (c) is injective for all c ∈ Σ. From this it fol-
lows that the scenario of perfect privacy seems to be unattain-
able.5 Finally, if such a privacy mapping function R exists,
it would assure optimality of Equation (1). Fortunately (and
somewhat unintuitively), such a mapping function can be at-
tained as shown in the following sequence of results.
Lemma 3. If there exists a function f(z, s) such that
p(z|c, s) = f(z, s) for all c ∈ Σ, z ∈ I and s ∈ S then
p(z|s) ≡ f(z, s)
Proof. p(z|s) = ∑c∈Σ p(z, c|s) = ∑c∈Σ p(z|s, c) · p(c|s) =∑
c∈Σ f(z, s) · p(c|s) = f(z, s) ·
∑
c∈Σ p(c|s) = f(z, s)
Using Lemma 3, we prove the following theorem, which is
a sufficient condition for optimality of Equation (1).
5We consider “perfect privacy” to be that the adversary’s belief about C
given S doesn’t change after observing Z.
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Theorem 1. If there exists a function f(z, s) such that
p(z|c, s) = f(z, s) for all c ∈ Σ, z ∈ I and s ∈ S then
DKL (p(c|z, s)||p(c|s)) = 0 for all z ∈ I and s ∈ S.6
Proof. Since p(z|c, s) = f(z, s) then using Lemma 3 we
know that p(z|s) ≡ f(z, s). Therefore, for any z ∈ I and
s ∈ S such that f(z, s) = p(z|c, s) = p(z|s) 6= 0 we
get p(c|z,s)p(c|s) =
p(z|c,s)·p(c|s)
p(c|s)·p(z|s) =
p(z|c,s)
p(z|s) = 1. This implies
DKL (p(c|z, s)||p(c|s)) = 0.
Corollary 1. If a privacy mapping function R achieves
p(z|c, s) = f(z, s) for some function f(z, s), for all c ∈
Σ, z ∈ I and s ∈ S then R is the optimal solution to Equa-
tion (1).
Proof. The result follows from Theorem 1 and the fact that
I(Z,C|S;R) = Ep(z,s)[DKL(p(c|z, s;R)||p(c|s;R))].
Note that Theorem 1 is independent of the model of p(c|s)
(and p(s)). This is a very important observation since it means
that in cases where a privacy mapping function R satisfies
the condition of the theorem, modeling the adversary’s prior
knowledge about information providers’ class memberships
is not needed. Furthermore, such privacy mapping function
achieves perfect privacy against any adversary, regardless of
her auxiliary knowledge p(c|s) (or p(s)). In the following the-
orems we provide examples of using Theorem 1 that also serve
as cases where such privacy mapping functions are attainable.
Theorem 2. If X|C = c, S = s ∼ N(µc,Σc) (Normal dis-
tribution) for every c ∈ Σ and s ∈ S , then [R(c)] (x) =
Σ
− 12
c · (x− µc) is an optimal solution to Equation (1).
Proof. It is easy to verify that Z|C = c, S = s ∼ N(0¯, I) for
every s ∈ S and c ∈ Σ, where 0¯ is the origin in the informa-
tion space (vector of zeros) and I is the identity matrix (of the
appropriate dimensions). This means that p(z|c, s) ≡ f(z, s)
(not a function of c). By using Theorem 1, we therefore know
that R is the optimal solution to Equation (1).
The proofs of the following theorems are similar to this
of Theorem 2 and were thus omitted for conciseness.
Theorem 3. If X|C = c, S = s ∼ Exp(λc) (Exponential
distribution) for every c ∈ Σ and s ∈ S , then [R(c)] (x) =
λcx is an optimal solution to Equation (1).
Theorem 4. If X|C = c, S = s ∼ Gamma(k, θc) (Gamma
distribution with shape and scale parameters) for every c ∈
Σ and s ∈ S , then [R(c)] (x) = xθc is an optimal solution
to Equation (1).
Theorem 5. If X|C = c, S = s ∼ U(ac, bc) (Continu-
ous Uniform distribution) for every c ∈ Σ and s ∈ S, then
[R(c)] (x) = x−acbc−ac is an optimal solution to Equation (1).
6(Cover and Thomas, 2006, Definition 8.46): The Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence is defined as DKL(p||q) = Ep
[
log p
q
]
.
5 Implementation
In this section, we briefly describe an implementation of the
learning problem that is publicly available in the form of a
MATLAB7 toolbox (Aranki and Bajcsy, 2015). In this imple-
mentation, we investigate the question of learning a privacy
mapping function R from a labeled data set D = {(xi, ci)i}.
This implies a simplifying assumption of ignoring the model-
ing of the random variable S corresponding to the identity of
the information providers. This assumption has the following
implications on the model in Figure 1. First, it implies that
the adversary views information providers as uniformly dis-
tributed, that is p(s) = 1|S| for all s ∈ S. Second, the assump-
tion implies that the subject-class membership belief function
of the adversary is equal for all subjects, that is p(c|s) = p(c)
for all s ∈ S and c ∈ Σ. As discussed in Section 4, in the
cases where perfect privacy is achievable, the solutions are in-
dependent of these models and therefore these implications are
not limiting. Further study is necessary to assess the level of
privacy-degradation incurred by this assumption in cases of
imperfect privacy. Third, this assumption implies that the gen-
erative model of data per class is independent of the subjects,
that is p(x|c, s) = p(x|c) for all x ∈ I, c ∈ Σ and s ∈ S.
Finally, I(Z,C|S;R) simplifies to I(Z,C;R).
In order to make the problem in Equation (1) computation-
ally tractable, a parametrized space for the privacy mapping
functions can be introduced, allowing for the optimization to
be performed on the parameter space. For example, consider
the following parameter space
Θ(n,Σ) = {(Ac, bc)c∈Σ|∀c ∈ Σ : Ac ∈ Rn×n,
bn ∈ Rn, det(Ac) 6= 0}
Then a parametrized space for affine privacy mapping func-
tions on the classes set Σ and information space I of dimen-
sion n can be defined as
ID(n,Σ, I) = {R( ·; θ)|θ ∈ Θ(n,Σ), R(·; θ) ∈
(
Σ→ II) ,
∀c ∈ Σ : [R(c; θ)] (x) = Ac · (x− bc)}
Provided a parameter search space Θ, the optimization
problem in Equation (1) can be re-written as
θ∗ = arg min
θ∈Θ
I(Z,C;R(·; θ)) (2)
The straightforward way to modeling the required distribu-
tions p(c) and p(x|c), from data, is non-parametrically by us-
ing high-dimensional histograms. This approach, while simple
to implement, suffers from the curse of dimensionality as its
complexity grows exponentially with the dimension of the in-
formation space. Once the models for p(c) and p(x|c) are con-
structed, the model for p(z|c) can be computed for any choice
of θ ∈ Θ allowing the computation of the objective function
7https://www.mathworks.com/products/matlab/
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Table 1: BMI-for-age weight status categories and The corre-
sponding BMI percentiles.
Weight Category BMI Percentile Range
Underweight BMI < 5%
Healthy Weight 5% ≤ BMI < 85%
Overweight 85% ≤ BMI < 95%
Obese 95% ≤ BMI
in Equation (2). Since the problem is non-convex, in order
to optimize the objective function, we employ the genetic al-
gorithm with the fitness function equal to the objective func-
tion in Equation (2). The chosen selection policy is fitness-
proportional while the chosen transformations (evolution/ge-
netic) operators are both mutations and crossovers (Banzhaf
et al., 1998).
6 Experimentation
In this section we walk the reader through an example that
aims to motivate and demonstrate PDI. In this example we use
data that are published by the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) as part of the National Health and Nutrition
Examination Survey of 2012.8 Specifically, we use the Body
Measures (BMX G) portion of the data.9
6.1 Setting
In our setting, we consider the disclosed information to be
both Body Mass Index (BMI) and weight. Our information
providers are assumed to be individuals of both genders that
are 19 years of age or less. We consider the private informa-
tion to be the weight status category of the subject. The CDC
considers the following four standard weight status categories
for the aforementioned age group i) underweight; ii) healthy
weight; iii) overweight; and iv) obese. There are 3355 data
points in the data set with subjects of 19 years of age or less.
According to the definitions of the CDC, the BMI category
of a child or a teen is classified based on the individual’s BMI
percentile among the same age and gender group as described
in Table 1. Since the age of the information provider is not
part of the information space, the inference of the weight status
category of the information provider based on BMI and weight
is not perfect. The data for the different classes are depicted
in Figure 2.
8https://wwwn.cdc.gov/nchs/nhanes/search/
nhanes11_12.aspx
9https://wwwn.cdc.gov/nchs/nhanes/2011-2012/BMX_
G.htm
6.1.1 Inference Based on Original Data
Using the data, we trained 3 SVM classifiers with Gaussian
kernels. The classifiers are aggregate in terms of the “posi-
tive” class in the following sense. The first classifier treats the
“positive” class as the Underweight category (and so the “neg-
ative” class is the rest of the categories). The second classifier
treats the “positive” class as either the underweight or healthy
weight categories. Finally, the third classifier treats the “posi-
tive” class as any category except the obese category. We used
a 40− 60 split for training-testing. In numbers, we used 1371
data points for training and 1984 data points for testing.
The training for all SVMs was done using 10-fold cross-
validation among the data in the training set to pick the best
σ of the Gaussian kernels and the best box boundaries of the
classifiers. The classification phase is done by taking a ma-
jority vote from the 3 classifiers and the output is the class
which most classifiers agree on. The results of the classifier
are described in Table 2 in terms of the confusion matrix of
the different categories. The total accuracy of the classifier is
88.31%.10
6.2 Privatizing Information
We would like to privatize the information at hand (BMI and
weight) in order to maintain the weight status category as
private as possible (based on the training set only). This
scenario simulates a tele-monitoring scenario and fits the as-
sumptions and motivation introduced in Section 3. There-
fore, we aim to utilize PDI in order to privatize the data
as discussed earlier. In order to learn the privacy mapping
function from the training data, we use the MATLAB tool-
box mentioned in Section 5 (Aranki and Bajcsy, 2015). We
used the affine privacy mapping functions for the parame-
terized search space as shown in the example in Section 5.
Note that there are extra degrees of freedom in the problem,
since any privacy mapping functions R1 and R2 related by
∀c ∈ Σ : R2(c) = A · (R1(c) − b) yield the same objec-
tive value in Equation (1) for any A ∈ Rn×n, det(A) 6= 0
and b ∈ Rn. That is, applying the same injective affine trans-
formation to all encoding functions in R does not change the
value of I(Z,C|S;R). Therefore, in our problem we fix the
encoding function of the “underweight” class to the identity
function, i.e. [R(“underweight”)] (x) = x.
The resultant privatized information is depicted in Figure 3.
It is clear that it should be much harder to do inference of the
weight category based on this privatized data, given the de-
creased distinguishability between classes. Note that calculat-
ing the privatized information is simple and efficient since now
we know the parameters for the privacy mapping functions for
the different classes.
10The adopted total accuracy measure is trace(M)/N where M is the
confusion matrix andN is the cardinality of the test set. This is the percentage
of true classifications over the test set.
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Table 2: Confusion matrix before privatizing. UW = Un-
derweight, HW = Healthy Weight, OW = Overweight, OB =
Obese
Ground Truth Category
UW HW OW OB
Pr
ed
ic
te
d
C
at
eg
or
y UW 47 20 0 0
HW 14 1203 66 1
OW 0 45 194 47
OB 0 2 37 308
Figure 2: BMI and weight for the different weight status
groups.
6.2.1 Inference Based on Privatized Data
In order to evaluate the quality of the privatization, we now
train new 3 SVM classifiers with the same training procedure
as in Section 6.1.1, but this time using the privatized data (and
of course, encoding the test set too for evaluation). Same as
before, we then use a majority vote from the 3 classifiers to
predict the class of any data point. The resultant confusion
matrix is described in Table 3.
It is clear that the classification results are degraded after
privatizing the information. The total accuracy dropped to
66.03% (from 88.31%). Given that the data from different
classes are highly indistinguishable, the classifier now clas-
sifies most data points as “healthy weight”. This is to be ex-
pected since most of the data points are in the “healthy weight”
category. In informal words, if a classifier would have to make
a “bet”, it would bet on the class with the most amount of data
points. Formally, a lower bound on the total accuracy can be
achieved by considering the trivial classifier that always pre-
dicts “healthy weight” (deterministic), which has total accu-
racy of 1270/1948 = 64.01%. This shows that our result of
66.03% is not much further from a lower-bound guaranteed
accuracy.
Note that the data set is biased in size against the “un-
derweight” category. There are only 126 data points with
weight category “underweight” out of the 3355 total data
points (3.76%). This makes privatizing that class particu-
larly hard, especially because the modeling is based on n-
dimensional histograms and is not parametric. For this reason
the classification results before and after privatization for the
Table 3: Confusion matrix after privatizing. UW = Under-
weight, HW = Healthy Weight, OW = Overweight, OB =
Obese
Ground Truth Category
UW HW OW OB
Pr
ed
ic
te
d
C
at
eg
or
y UW 48 14 0 5
HW 13 1217 276 290
OW 0 25 13 29
OB 0 14 0 32
Figure 3: BMI and weight for the different weight status
groups after privatization. The difference between the two
plots is the order of plotting the different classes (for visual
clarity).
“underweight” category are comparable.
To intuitively demonstrate how privacy is preserved, we take
a piece of privatized information at random from our data
set, z = [77.17, 296.45]T , without looking at its ground truth
weight category. If we decode this data point using the de-
coding function of “healthy weight”, we get x = [21, 53.8]T ,
which is a legitimate “healthy weight” BMI and weight data
point. If we use the decoding function of “overweight”, we get
x = [25.12, 62.4]T , which is also a legitimate “overweight”
BMI and weight data point. Similarly, if we use the decoding
function of “obese”, we get x = [30.42, 69.08]T , which is also
a legitimate “obese” BMI and weight data point.
7 Discussion and Future Work
In this paper, we presented a view on privacy in which the
data themselves need not be the private object, but rather can
be used to infer private information. From this point of view,
we derived a framework that preserves the privacy of the pri-
vate information from being inferred from the communicated
messages. We provided theoretical analysis and properties of
the devised framework. An important result (Theorem 1) pro-
vided conditions that ensure perfect privacy while preserving
full data utility. We showed that such conditions are achievable
by providing closed-form solutions to some cases of data gen-
erative models. Theorem 1 further showed that perfect privacy
is not a function of the modeling of the adversary’s auxiliary
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knowledge about the private information per subject, p(c|s)
(or p(s)). This observation is important because modeling
adversary’s auxiliary knowledge is generally a hard problem,
and because it showed that perfect privacy can be achieved re-
gardless of the adversary’s auxiliary knowledge. That is, the
same privatization protects information providers from all ad-
versaries, regardless of their auxiliary knowledge.
Subsequently, we discussed an implementation of the learn-
ing problem resulting from the framework and demonstrated
its use with a data set published by the Center for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention using data about individuals’ Body Mass
Indices, weights and their weight status categories. The exper-
imentation shows that after privatizing the data set, the clas-
sification accuracy drops significantly, near a lower bound of
guaranteed classification accuracy, thus achieving our set goal.
We make two important remarks about the approach pre-
sented in this paper. First, the described approach is philo-
sophically different from the classical cryptography as it pro-
vides a model where the objective is maintaining the secrecy
of the private information that is not the data themselves but
the information that can be inferred based on the data. Sec-
ond, even though the proposed approach is privacy-centric, it
is not meant to serve as an alternative to cryptography but as a
complement to it. That said, any message can be “privatized”
then encrypted. If the encryption is in that case compromised
by an adversary getting access to the clear text message, the
privacy is still preserved.
The current implementation of the devised learning problem
suffers from the curse of dimensionality. The cost of learning
grows exponentially with the number of dimensions of the in-
formation space. This is a result of our choice to model p(z|c)
as a multi-dimensional histogram. To make this framework
practical, there is a need to study other ways of estimating the
mutual information measure between the disclosed informa-
tion and the private class. One appealing option is leveraging
parametric learning and modeling each distribution p(z|c) as
a mixture model which could result in more computationally
efficient estimation of the mutual information measure.
The presented framework has the potential of being ex-
tended to scenarios where the data recipient is not completely
certain about the private class but is still more certain than the
adversary. Such scenarios are clearly more general and may
result in wider applicability of the framework to other scenar-
ios than presented here. Indeed, in such scenarios, commu-
nicated messages can only be interpreted in a statistical sense
and the implications of such assumptions must be studied as
well.
Furthermore, the current implementation of the learning
problem assumes that adversaries have equal belief about all
the information providers so that the adversary’s belief about
C is independent of S and that the generative model of data X
per private class C is independent of S. This is a simplifying
assumption and its implications need to be further studied and
remedied.
Given the non-convexity and the complexity of the prob-
lem at hand, areas for future research include studying heuris-
tic techniques to learn the privacy mapping functions from
sufficient and/or necessary conditions for local improvements
in the mutual information as a function of local changes in
the privacy mapping functions. This approach, as opposed
to finding global optimal solutions to Equation (1), is analo-
gous to finding minimal anonymization as opposed to optimal
anonymization in privacy preserving data publishing (Fung
et al., 2010).
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Katherine Driggs Campbell for the ini-
tial conversation that spurred this idea. We are also greatly in-
debted to Gregorij Kurillo, Yusuf Erol and Arash Nourian for
their fruitful discussions and feedback that significantly im-
proved the quality of this paper. This work was supported
in part by TRUST, Team for Research in Ubiquitous Secure
Technology, which receives funding support for the National
Science Foundation (NSF award number CCF-0424422).
References
Nabil R Adam and John C Worthmann. Security-control meth-
ods for statistical databases: A comparative study. ACM
Computing Surveys (CSUR), 21(4):515–556, 1989.
Daniel Aranki and Ruzena Bajcsy. Private disclosure of in-
formation matlab toolbox, 2015. URL https://www.
eecs.berkeley.edu/˜daranki/PDI/.
Daniel Aranki, Gregorij Kurillo, Posu Yan, David Liebovitz,
and Ruzena Bajcsy. Continuous, real-time, tele-monitoring
of patients with chronic heart-failure - lessons learned from
a pilot study. ICST, 11 2014. doi: 10.4108/icst.bodynets.
2014.257036.
Wolfgang Banzhaf, Peter Nordin, Robert E Keller, and
Frank D Francone. Genetic programming: An introduction,
volume 1. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Inc., 1998.
Lynne Bishop, Bradford J Holmes, and Christopher M Kelley.
National consumer health privacy survey 2005. California
HealthCare Foundation, Oakland, CA, 2005.
Sarwat I Chaudhry, Jennifer A Mattera, Jeptha P Curtis,
John A Spertus, Jeph Herrin, Zhenqiu Lin, Christopher O
Phillips, Beth V Hodshon, Lawton S Cooper, and Har-
lan M Krumholz. Telemonitoring in patients with heart
failure. New England Journal of Medicine, 363(24):2301–
2309, 2010.
Robyn A Clark, Sally C Inglis, Finlay A McAlister, John GF
Cleland, and Simon Stewart. Telemonitoring or structured
8
telephone support programmes for patients with chronic
heart failure: Systematic review and meta-analysis. BMJ,
334(7600):942, 2007.
Graham Cormode. Personal privacy vs population privacy:
Learning to attack anonymization. In Proceedings of the
17th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge
discovery and data mining, pages 1253–1261. ACM, 2011.
Thomas M Cover and Joy A Thomas. Elements of information
theory. John Wiley & Sons, 2 edition, 2006.
Dorothy E. Denning. A lattice model of secure information
flow. Commun. ACM, 19(5):236–243, May 1976. ISSN
0001-0782. doi: 10.1145/360051.360056. URL http:
//doi.acm.org/10.1145/360051.360056.
Dorothy E. Denning and Jan Schlorer. Inference controls for
statistical databases. Computer, 16(7):69–82, 1983.
George Duncan and Diane Lambert. The risk of disclosure
for microdata. Journal of Business & Economic Statis-
tics, 7(2):207–217, 1989. doi: 10.1080/07350015.1989.
10509729. URL http://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/abs/10.1080/07350015.1989.10509729.
George T Duncan and Diane Lambert. Disclosure-limited data
dissemination. Journal of the American statistical associa-
tion, 81(393):10–18, 1986.
Cynthia Dwork. Differential privacy. In Automata, languages
and programming, pages 1–12. Springer, 2006.
Cynthia Dwork. Differential privacy: A survey of results. In
Theory and Applications of Models of Computation, pages
1–19. Springer, 2008.
Csilla Farkas and Sushil Jajodia. The inference problem:
A survey. SIGKDD Explor. Newsl., 4(2):6–11, Decem-
ber 2002. ISSN 1931-0145. doi: 10.1145/772862.
772864. URL http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/
772862.772864.
Benjamin Fung, Ke Wang, Rui Chen, and Philip S Yu. Privacy-
preserving data publishing: A survey of recent develop-
ments. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 42(4):14, 2010.
Gregory Giamouzis, Dimos Mastrogiannis, Konstantinos
Koutrakis, George Karayannis, Charalambos Parisis, Chris
Rountas, Elias Adreanides, George E Dafoulas, Panagio-
tis C Stafylas, John Skoularigis, et al. Telemonitoring in
chronic heart failure: A systematic review. Cardiology Re-
search and Practice, 2012, 2012.
Aris Gkoulalas-Divanis, Grigorios Loukides, and Jimeng Sun.
Publishing data from electronic health records while pre-
serving privacy: A survey of algorithms. Journal of biomed-
ical informatics, 50:4–19, 2014.
Chun-Ju Hsiao and Esther Hing. Use and characteristics of
electronic health record systems among office-based physi-
cian practices, United States, 2001-2012. US Department
of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics, 2012.
Sally Inglis. Structured telephone support or telemonitoring
programmes for patients with chronic heart failure. Journal
of Evidence-Based Medicine, 3(4):228–228, 2010.
Ninghui Li, Tiancheng Li, and Suresh Venkatasubramanian. t-
closeness: Privacy beyond k-anonymity and l-diversity. In
IEEE International Conference on Data Engineering, vol-
ume 7, pages 106–115, 2007.
Ashwin Machanavajjhala, Daniel Kifer, Johannes Gehrke, and
Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam. L-diversity: Pri-
vacy beyond k-anonymity. ACM Trans. Knowl. Discov.
Data, 1(1), March 2007. ISSN 1556-4681. doi: 10.1145/
1217299.1217302. URL http://doi.acm.org/10.
1145/1217299.1217302.
Brad Miller, Ling Huang, Anthony D Joseph, and J Doug Ty-
gar. I know why you went to the clinic: Risks and realization
of https traffic analysis. arXiv preprint arXiv:1403.0297,
2014.
National Association of Health Data Organization. A guide to
state-level ambulatory care data collection activities, Octo-
ber 1996.
Ravi S Sandhu. Lattice-based access control models. Com-
puter, 26(11):9–19, Nov 1993. ISSN 0018-9162. doi:
10.1109/2.241422.
State of California Office of Statewide Health Planning and
Development. California inpatient data reporting manual,
medical information reporting for California, 7th edition,
September 2014.
Latanya Sweeney. k-anonymity: A model for protecting pri-
vacy. International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and
Knowledge-Based Systems, 10(05):557–570, 2002.
Stanley L Warner. Randomized response: A survey technique
for eliminating evasive answer bias. Journal of the Ameri-
can Statistical Association, 60(309):63–69, 1965.
Andrew M White, Austin R Matthews, Kevin Z Snow, and
Fabian Monrose. Phonotactic reconstruction of encrypted
voip conversations: Hookt on fon-iks. In Security and Pri-
vacy (SP), 2011 IEEE Symposium on, pages 3–18. IEEE,
2011.
9
